publications new

 

Abstract

I analyze the interaction between post-election lobbying and the voting decisions of forward-looking voters. The existing literature has shown that in models with ciitzen candidates form a dispersed distribution of preferences, lobbying has no influence on implemented policy. In my model with ideological parties, lobbying is shown to have an effect on policy. In terms of welfare, I show that the median voter and the majority of voters are often better off with lobbying.

Abstract

This study examines how household financial risk tolerance is affected during the period of 2007 and 2009, which covered the eve and through of the financial crisis in the United States and what types of households are associated with the change of risk tolerance. Risk tolerance is measured bz two objective indicators, narrowlz and broadlz defined stock ownership, and a subjective indicator, risk taking attitude. Using panel data from 2007 to 2009 Survez of Consumer Finances, results show that during the financial crisis, the households in general are more risk averse, indicated by withdrawing from stock markets and holding a less risk taking attitude. In addition, Black and Hispanic households are more likely and households with higher education are less likely to withdraw from stock markets. Older households are less likely to change in risk tolerance during the financial crisis, as are richer households. The findings show panel data could generate novel results and contribute to the literature of financial risk tolerance.