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Abstract

We study the Chinese experience and provide evidence that central banks can play an active role in safeguarding financial stability. The narrative approach is used to disentangle macropudential policy actions from monetary actions. We show that reserve requirements, window guidance, supervisory pressure and housing-market policies can be used for macroprudential purposes. Our VAR estimates suggest that well-targeted macroprudential policy has immediate and persistent impact on credit, but no statistically significant impact on output. Macroprudential policy can be used to retain financial stability without triggering an economic slowdown, or as a complement to monetary policy to offset the buildup of financial vulnerabilities arising from monetary easing. A well-designed mix of these two policies helps to achieve both macroeconomic and financial stability objectives, which, however, requires central banks to maintain a multi-instrument framework

Abstract

I analyze the interaction between post-election lobbying and the voting decisions of forward-looking voters. The existing literature has shown that in models with ciitzen candidates form a dispersed distribution of preferences, lobbying has no influence on implemented policy. In my model with ideological parties, lobbying is shown to have an effect on policy. In terms of welfare, I show that the median voter and the majority of voters are often better off with lobbying.