Dr. Heiner Mikosch - Seminar Presentation

Date and Time: May 17th, 2018, 10:00 am - 12:00 pm

Room: A 101 in the Economics Building (Museum)

Abstract

This study explores the welfare and distributional effects of fiscal volatility using a neoclassical stochastic growth model with incomplete markets. In our model, households face uninsurable idiosyncratic risks in their labor income and discount factor processes, and ...

Date and Time: April 16th, 2018, 9:00 - 11:00 am

Room: A 101 in the Economics Building (Museum)

Abstract

China´s highly controversial one-child policy was implemented from 1979 to 2015. It was amended several times and resulted in differential treatments in the birth policy depending on the parent(s)`s status of being an only-child or not. In January 2016 the one-child policy was abolished, and all families are now allowed to have up to two children.

Date and Time: April 4th, 2018, 3:00 - 5:00 pm

Room: A 101 in the Economics Building (Museum)

Abstract

In this paper I develop a model of a competing mechanism allowing buyers already engaged in an auction to decide whether to stay in it or buy an object from a posted price outside.

Date and Time: March 27th, 2018, 9:00 - 11:00 am

Room: A 101 in the Economics Building (Museum)

Abstract

This paper revisits and refines the definition of zombie firms in China from manufacturing sector. These statified zombie firms are heavily indebted, strongly linked with state ownership, with a higher inventory-to-output ratio. Based on China Industrial Census Survey, this study documents the evidence suggesting a trade-off between misallocation and stimulation economic policies. China implemented an enormous monetary expansion for the post-2008 periods. It shwos the number and the magnitude of undesirable zombie firms increased sharply since then.

Date and Time: January 16th, 2018, 10:00 - 11:30 am

Room: A 101 in the Economics Building (Museum)

Abstract

By a theorem due to Sklar in 1959, a multivariate distribution can be represented in terms of its underlying margins by binding them together a copula function. Copulas are useful devices to explain the dependence structure between variables by eliminating the influence of marginals.

Date and Time: December 26th, 2017, 10:00 - 11:30 am

Room: A 101 in the Economics Building (Museum)

Abstract

This paper examines crashes following price run-ups and rebounds following price declines in U.S. state-level housing markets over the past 40 years. We find that a sharp increase in house prices predicts a higher probability of a crash, and likewise a sharp decline in house prices predicts a higher probability of a rebound.

Date and Time: December 14th, 2017, 2:00 - 3:30 pm

Room: A 101 in the Economics Building (Museum)

Abstract

The effects of asymmetric information are often difficult to detect empirically, such as in insurance settings (Chiappori, Jullien, Salanie and Salanie, 2006). We show that allowing for the possiblity of reference-dependent preferences can assist with this callenge. Using detialed auto insurance claims data and adopting the methodology of Allen, DeChow, Pope and Wu (forthcoming) which studies reference-dependence in marathon finishing times, we show that policy holders exaggerate their damage claims in a manner consistent with reference dependent moral hazard with the original premium as a reference point.

Date and Time: December 14th, 2017, 10:00 - 11:30 pm

Room: A 101 in the Economics Building (Museum)

 

Abstract

How does an individual`s position within a social distribution influence their desire to take risk? Reference-dependent loss aversion (Kahnemann and Tversky, 1979; Koszegi and RAbin, 2006, 2007) adapted to a social setting, suggests that individuals may find risk more appealing when they are doing especially well or poorly compared to their peers. We examine the effects of a social position on risk attitudes in a simple experiment which allows subjects to take risks at different locations in the social distribution against a backdrop of real effort tasks.

Date and Time: December 8th, 2017, 10:00 - 11:30 pm

Room: A 101 in the Economics Building (Museum)

Date and Time: October 20th, 2017, 2:00 - 3:30 pm

Room: A 101 in the Economics Building (Museum)

Abstract

We trace the rise of the so called oligarchs in post-Soviet Russia and examine their relationship to income distribution in Russia. When Russia moved to a market economy in the 1990s a new business elite evolved. Russia’s distinctive path towards market economy, among other factors, gave rise to the oligarchs who now control large parts of the economy and have a strong standing within politics and society.

Date and Time: June 23rd, 2017, 10:00 - 11:30 am

Room: A 101 in the Economics Building (Museum)

 

Abstract

In an effort to accomomodate a change in the U.S. Federal Highway Administration´s goals towards "race-neutral methods" concerning the involvement of Disadvantaged Business Enterprises in procurement contracting, the Texas Department of Transportation created a Learning, Information, Networking and Collaboration (LINC) bidder training program.

Date and Time: June 6th, 2017, 10:00 - 11:30 am

Room: A 101 in the Economics Building (Museum)

Abstract

This paper examines who receives direct government subsidy when a firm faces delisting risk and how such subsidy affects a firm’s market valuation, profitability, and labor intensity. I find that subsidies are more likely to be granted to firms that have high risk of delisting, political connections and big size, regardless whether they are state owned or private.

Date and Time: May 26th, 2017, 10:00 - 11:30 am

Room: A 101 in the Economics Building (Museum)

Abstract

We model fixed costs in the banking industry, and we develop a framework in which the optimal number of banks is endogenously determined. We use the model to evaluate how ratcheting up the Basel regulatory regime is likely to influence both the competitive structure of banking markets and the overall quality of bank loans. A regulatory toughening involving higher capital requirements and increased fixed costs for banks reduces the degree of competition in banking markets. Furthermore, the weight of these changes falls more heavily on banks that choose to expend resources to monitor their loans to address loan losses.

 

Date and Time: May 19th, 2017, 10:00 - 11:30 am

Room: A 101 in the Economics Building (Museum)

Abstract

It remains controversial whether cumulative voting (CV) can improve corporate governance. With hand-collected director-level data, we conduct DID-style analysis of China´s CV reform by using CV firms and control groups derived from alternative matching methods. We find that CV raises the board representation of non-controlling substantial shareholders, especially in a subsample whose top ten shareholders are unrelated. CV enhances the "disinterestedness" of outside directors. CV-elected directors have better professional and educational qualifications. CV firms without related top ten shareholders display higher Tobin´s Q and market-to-book ratio. But the incremental improvements are insufficient to curb tunneling activities and increase accounting performances.

 

Date and Time: May 9th, 2017, 10:00 - 11:30 am

Room: A 101 in the Economics Building (Museum)

Abstract

Real data in social, behaviroal, education and economic research are often not normally distributed. Geary (1947) has long pointed out that "Normality is a myth; there never was, and never will be a normal distribution."

Date and Time: May 2nd, 2017, 10:00 - 11:30 am

Room: A 101 in the Economics Building (Museum)

Abstract

During the Maoist period (1949-76) outstanding achievements in health translated into the beginning of the demographic and epidoemiological transition in china. Yet, the period is also characterized by the presence of humanitarian crisis by using mean heights data from cohorts born between 1949 and 1976 in Henan province.

Date and Time: December 23rd, 2016, 10:00 - 11:30 am

Room: A 101 in the Economics Building (Museum)

Abstract

This study empirically shows that higher uncertainty leads to not only a simultaneous drop in consumption and investment, but also a rise in the relative price of investment goods. This negative relationship between the relative price and quantity of investment suggests that heightened uncertainty depresses investment as an adverse supply shock to the investment sector.

Date and Time: December 16th, 2016, 10:00 - 11:30 am

Room: A 101 in the Economics Building (Museum)

Abstract

The use of money for tax evasion in the self-employed sector is characterized as an equilibrium outcome in the model economy where the self-employed sector´s output is a natural credit good and all the economic activities are costlessly monitored by the government, except those involving cash in the self-employed sector and all the other cash purchases.

Date and Time: December 14th, 2016, 10:00 - 11:30 am

Room: A 101 in the Economics Building (Museum)

 

Abstract

This paper addresses the future of cooperation between China and the US combining game theoretic models of international cooperation and probabilistic models of voting (US) respectively leadership determination (China). The modelling of international cooperation by ideas from McGillivray’s and Smith’s influential “Punishing the prince: a theory of interstate relations, political institutions, and leader change” (2008) and subsequent work by Klingelhöfer.

Date and Time: December 2nd, 2016, 2:30 - 4:00 pm

Room: A 101 in the Economics Building (Museum)

Abstract

We study the Chinese case to tackle two research questions on macroprudential policies: 1.What kind of policy instruments can a central bank apply in safeguarding financial stability? 2. How effective are these instruments? In so doing, we first employ the narrative approach, studying the PBC’s documents to identify the policy intention behind each policy action and hence disentangle those macroprudential policy actions from monetary policy actions.