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Yinghui Chen (Zhongnan University of Economics and Law) - Does Regulatory Reform of Cumulative Voting Improve Minority Shareholder Protection?

Date and Time: May 19th, 2017, 10:00 - 11:30 am

Room: A 101 in the Economics Building (Museum)

Abstract

It remains controversial whether cumulative voting (CV) can improve corporate governance. With hand-collected director-level data, we conduct DID-style analysis of China´s CV reform by using CV firms and control groups derived from alternative matching methods. We find that CV raises the board representation of non-controlling substantial shareholders, especially in a subsample whose top ten shareholders are unrelated. CV enhances the "disinterestedness" of outside directors. CV-elected directors have better professional and educational qualifications. CV firms without related top ten shareholders display higher Tobin´s Q and market-to-book ratio. But the incremental improvements are insufficient to curb tunneling activities and increase accounting performances.

 


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