Date and Time: December 18th, 2019, 3:00 - 5:00 pm
Room: A 101 in the Economics Building (Museum)
This paper shows how property rights security improves over time as a result of increasing legal quality and political democratization in a political economy context, where political and legal institutions adapt to evolving factor composition of land and capital in the dynamic economic development process. There seems to exist a clear sequence of different forms of protection in that it is unlikely to have a strong rule of law with an exploitative political regime, or to have a democratic political system when the distribution of potential coercive power is too skewed.
The routine form of protection thus shifts from coercion to politics and then to law. The predictions of the model are consistent with general historical patterns in England.
About the Speaker
Fali Huang is associate professor at the Singapore Management University. Her research interests are Applied Microeconomics (Institutions, Education, Economic Governance) and the Political Economy of Development and Growth. She received her PhD degree from the University of Pennsylvania.