Dr. Heiner Mikosch - Seminar Presentation

Date and Time: December 8th, 2017, 10:00 - 11:30 pm

Room: A 101 in the Economics Building (Museum)

Date and Time: October 20th, 2017, 2:00 - 3:30 pm

Room: A 101 in the Economics Building (Museum)

Abstract

We trace the rise of the so called oligarchs in post-Soviet Russia and examine their relationship to income distribution in Russia. When Russia moved to a market economy in the 1990s a new business elite evolved. Russia’s distinctive path towards market economy, among other factors, gave rise to the oligarchs who now control large parts of the economy and have a strong standing within politics and society.

Date and Time: June 23rd, 2017, 10:00 - 11:30 am

Room: A 101 in the Economics Building (Museum)

 

Abstract

In an effort to accomomodate a change in the U.S. Federal Highway Administration´s goals towards "race-neutral methods" concerning the involvement of Disadvantaged Business Enterprises in procurement contracting, the Texas Department of Transportation created a Learning, Information, Networking and Collaboration (LINC) bidder training program.

Date and Time: June 6th, 2017, 10:00 - 11:30 am

Room: A 101 in the Economics Building (Museum)

Abstract

This paper examines who receives direct government subsidy when a firm faces delisting risk and how such subsidy affects a firm’s market valuation, profitability, and labor intensity. I find that subsidies are more likely to be granted to firms that have high risk of delisting, political connections and big size, regardless whether they are state owned or private.

Date and Time: May 26th, 2017, 10:00 - 11:30 am

Room: A 101 in the Economics Building (Museum)

Abstract

We model fixed costs in the banking industry, and we develop a framework in which the optimal number of banks is endogenously determined. We use the model to evaluate how ratcheting up the Basel regulatory regime is likely to influence both the competitive structure of banking markets and the overall quality of bank loans. A regulatory toughening involving higher capital requirements and increased fixed costs for banks reduces the degree of competition in banking markets. Furthermore, the weight of these changes falls more heavily on banks that choose to expend resources to monitor their loans to address loan losses.

 

Date and Time: May 19th, 2017, 10:00 - 11:30 am

Room: A 101 in the Economics Building (Museum)

Abstract

It remains controversial whether cumulative voting (CV) can improve corporate governance. With hand-collected director-level data, we conduct DID-style analysis of China´s CV reform by using CV firms and control groups derived from alternative matching methods. We find that CV raises the board representation of non-controlling substantial shareholders, especially in a subsample whose top ten shareholders are unrelated. CV enhances the "disinterestedness" of outside directors. CV-elected directors have better professional and educational qualifications. CV firms without related top ten shareholders display higher Tobin´s Q and market-to-book ratio. But the incremental improvements are insufficient to curb tunneling activities and increase accounting performances.

 

Date and Time: May 9th, 2017, 10:00 - 11:30 am

Room: A 101 in the Economics Building (Museum)

Abstract

Real data in social, behaviroal, education and economic research are often not normally distributed. Geary (1947) has long pointed out that "Normality is a myth; there never was, and never will be a normal distribution."

Date and Time: May 2nd, 2017, 10:00 - 11:30 am

Room: A 101 in the Economics Building (Museum)

Abstract

During the Maoist period (1949-76) outstanding achievements in health translated into the beginning of the demographic and epidoemiological transition in china. Yet, the period is also characterized by the presence of humanitarian crisis by using mean heights data from cohorts born between 1949 and 1976 in Henan province.

Date and Time: December 23rd, 2016, 10:00 - 11:30 am

Room: A 101 in the Economics Building (Museum)

Abstract

This study empirically shows that higher uncertainty leads to not only a simultaneous drop in consumption and investment, but also a rise in the relative price of investment goods. This negative relationship between the relative price and quantity of investment suggests that heightened uncertainty depresses investment as an adverse supply shock to the investment sector.

Date and Time: December 16th, 2016, 10:00 - 11:30 am

Room: A 101 in the Economics Building (Museum)

Abstract

The use of money for tax evasion in the self-employed sector is characterized as an equilibrium outcome in the model economy where the self-employed sector´s output is a natural credit good and all the economic activities are costlessly monitored by the government, except those involving cash in the self-employed sector and all the other cash purchases.

Date and Time: December 14th, 2016, 10:00 - 11:30 am

Room: A 101 in the Economics Building (Museum)

 

Abstract

This paper addresses the future of cooperation between China and the US combining game theoretic models of international cooperation and probabilistic models of voting (US) respectively leadership determination (China). The modelling of international cooperation by ideas from McGillivray’s and Smith’s influential “Punishing the prince: a theory of interstate relations, political institutions, and leader change” (2008) and subsequent work by Klingelhöfer.

Date and Time: December 2nd, 2016, 2:30 - 4:00 pm

Room: A 101 in the Economics Building (Museum)

Abstract

We study the Chinese case to tackle two research questions on macroprudential policies: 1.What kind of policy instruments can a central bank apply in safeguarding financial stability? 2. How effective are these instruments? In so doing, we first employ the narrative approach, studying the PBC’s documents to identify the policy intention behind each policy action and hence disentangle those macroprudential policy actions from monetary policy actions.

Date and Time: November 23rd, 2016, 10:00 - 11:30 am

Room: A 101 in the Economics Building (Museum)

Abstract

We build a simple banking firm model to understand why Chinese banks sell wealth management products (WMPs). Such products are supposed to be pooled investments in which banks only serve as the “agent”, but we argue that WMPs are more similar as non-checkable deposit than as investment funds.

Date and Time: November 16th, 2016, 10:00 - 11:30 am

Room: A 101 in the Economics Building (Museum)

Abstract

We construct aggregates based on four superlative index numbers, the Fisher, Sato-Vartia, Törnqvist and Walsh and the atheoretical simple sum for previously identified weakly separable blockings of goods. We examine how well these aggregates “fit” the data.

Date and Time: October 12th, 2016, 10:00 - 11:30 am

Room: A 101 in the Economics Building (Museum)

Abstract

In the presence of limited liability, the incentive compatibility constraints in financial contracting models with asymmetric information are wekaer than assumed in much of the literature. In this paper, we identify the problem that has been overlooked in the literature and provide a rigorous proof of optimality of debt contracts under fairly general assumptions.

Date and Time: September 29th, 2016, 10:00 - 11:30 am

Room: A 101 in the Economics Building (Museum)

About the paper

This paper evaluates potentially heterogeneous direct plus indirect effects of policy-related trade costs. It accounts for endogeneity in policy-related trade costs by modelling how they are determined by fundamental drivers of bilateral trade.

It disentangle two sources of non-linearity/heterogeneity:

Date and Time: September 2nd, 2016, 10:00 - 11:30 am

Room: A 101 in the Economics Building (Museum)

Abstract

Since the beginning of the financial crisis, a lively debate has emerged regarding which monetary policy rule the Fed (and other central banks) should follow, if any. To clarify this debate, several questions must be answered. Which monetary policy rule fits best

Date and Time: May 23rd, 2016, 10:30 - 11:30 am

Room: A 101 in the Economics Building (Museum)

About the Speaker

Dr. Fei Song is a Professor of HRM/OB in the Ted Rogers School of Management, Ryerson University. Dr. Fei Song is trained in the field of Organizational Behavior. She received her PhD from the Schulich School of Business in 2005.

Date and Time: May 23rd, 2016, 10:30 - 11:30 am

Room: A 101 in the Economics Building (Museum)

About the Speaker

Prof. C. Bram Cadsby is Full Professor of Economics at the University of Guelphs, Canada. He received his PhD from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. His research interests are experimental economics.

Date and Time: May 20th, 2016, 3:00 - 4:30 pm

Room: A 101 in the Economics Building (Museum)

Abstract

Rajan (2010) points to rising income inequality as a root cause of the recent financial crisis through high household leverage. However, some empirical studies conclude that crises bear no relation to inequality.